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1 Introduction 
The subject of the present chapter is the contribution of the Court of Justice to the 
development of the prohibition of discrimination under Union law. 1 This develop-
ment began in the 1950s, when the law of the European Coal and Steel Community 
was the starting point for the meaning given by the Court to the legal concept of 
discrimination. Since then, a wealth of case-law has further refined this meaning and 
elaborated on the place of non-discrimination in the Union's legal order. In a broader 
context, non-discrimination law has also been the starting point for the development 
of a number of general elements of Union law, for example the duty of conform 
interpretation and the right to an individual substantive remedy in case of a breach of 
rights? 
It is obviously not possible in the present limited framework to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of all this. Instead, the focus will be on one particular 
aspect which both connects, and has an overarching effect on, the overall system of 
Union non-discrimination law: According to the Court's case-law, a prohibition of 
discrimination can flow not only from enacted (written) Union law but also from 
(unwritten) general principles. Faced with the lack, or limited reach, of written 
non-discrimination law, the Court recognised the existence of two additional and 
distinct layers of general principles of 'equality' /'equal treatment' /'non-discrimi-
nation' (the Court uses these terms interchangeably,3 and so does this contribu-
tion). These layers consist, first, of a general principle of equality tout court (i.e. a 
principle that is not linked to any discrimination ground) and, second, of a number 
of general principles of equality linked to particular discrimination grounds (e.g. 
age, sex, sexual orientation, nationality). In the resulting multi-level system, the 
written prohibitions of discrimination are specific expressions of the general 
principles. Recent case-law further shows that Articles 20, 21 and 23 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: the Charter) are part of this system. 
Perhaps the most debated decisions of the Court of recent years on discrimi-
nation relate to the second layer of this system (i .e. that of the general principles of 
equality with a particular focus), namely the Mangold line of case-law.4 It raises 
questions not only about the relevance and function of the general principles of 
equality in the larger system of Union law, but also about the interrelation between 
1 The present contribution is limited to EU law. As \\aS noted already by Steindorff 1965, p. 59 
the principle of equality (and thereby also the prohibition of discrimination) has a different face in 
different legal orders. More recently, Diebold 2011 has written about the high fragmentation of 
the non-discrimination principle in international economic law. 
2 See e.g. Tobler 20llb. 
3 According to the Court, the terms 'non-discrimination' and 'equal treatment' are 'simply two 
labels for a single general principle of [Union] Jaw'; Case C-422/02 P Europe Chemi-Con 
(Deutschland) GmbH v Council and Commission [2005] ECR I-791, para 33. 
4 Case-Jaw beginning with Case C-144/04 We mer Mangold v Rudiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. 
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the different layers of equality law and the meaning of the prohibition of dis-
crimination on the level of the general principles. 
The present contribution aims to put this case-law in the larger context of the 
Unio~'s multi-level architecture of equality. After mapping the scene by briefly 
recallmg the breadth and the limits of the Union's present non-discrimination law, 
the contribution traces the creation through the Court's early non-discrimination 
case-law of the layered system of equality law. Thereafter, it turns to the practical 
relev~n~e o.f the two levels of the general principles of equality in cases of alleged 
d1scnrrunat10n and to the meaning of the prohibition of discrimination as it results 
from the Court's case-law. In the latter context, it will be argued that whilst this 
meaning generally remains rather elusive when a prohibition of discrimination 
flows from a general principle of equality, the Court in the Mangold line of case-
law has found a surprising way of making it quite specific. 
2 Mapping the Scene of the Union's Non-discrimination Law 
Since the Lisbon revision, non-discrimination has been explicitly recognised as a 
fundamental value of the European Union in Article 2 TEU. On the level of 
pri~ary law, the most notable provision to prohibit discrimination is undoubtedly 
Artlcle 21 of the Charter, which binds the EU institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies whenever they act under EU law, and the Member States when they are 
'implementing Union law' (Article 51(1) of the Charter) or 'when they act in the 
scope o~ Union law' (Explanations on the Charter). Article 21(1) contains an open-
ended hst of prohibited discrimination grounds, referring to 'any discrimination 
based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
featu~es, langua~e, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of 
a natwnal mmonty, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation' to which 
Article 21(2) adds nationality. On the level of secondary law only Articl~ ld(l) of 
the Staff Regulations is similar; it contains the same list of grounds but adds that 
under certain conditions non-marital partnerships shall be treated as marriages. 
Other Union non-discrimination law is quite different. Firstly, some provisions 
prohibit discrimination without mentioning any grounds. For example, Article 
40(2) TFEU in the context of agricultural law simply prohibits 'any discrimination 
between producers or consumers within the Union'. Similarly, Article 4(b) of the 
ECSC Treaty prohibited 'measures or practices discriminating among producers, 
among buyers or among consumers, specifically as concerns prices, delivery terms 
and transportation rates'. More recently, Article 4(2) (equality of EU Member 
States)5 and Article 9 TEU (equality of EU citizens) have been construed in the 
same manner. Secondly, where written law does focus on discrimination grounds, 
s See avant la lettre Case C-273/04 Poland v Council [2007] ECR I-8925 (old and new Member 
States). 
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these are limited in number, though their list is longer than is indicated by the mere 
text of the Treaties. In addition to well-known grounds such as EU nationality 
(Article 18(1) TFEU),6 origin of a good (e.g. Articles 95(1) and 110(1) TFEU), sex 
(Article 157(1) and (2) TFEU and secondary law), racial or ethnic origin 
(Directive 2000/43),7 religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation 
(Directive 2000178),8 there are also part-time work (clause 4 of the Framework 
Agreement attached to Directive 97/81),9 fixed-term work (clause 4 of the 
Framework Agreement attached to Directive 1999170),10 registration of a vehicle 
and origin or destination of a transport operation (Article 7(3) of Directive 1999/ 
62)11 and third-country nationality (e.g. Article 11 of Directive 20031109),12 to 
mention a few random examples. By their very nature, not only the number but 
also the substantive meaning of these grounds is limited. 13 Thirdly, whether or not 
they focus on particular grounds, almost all non-discrimination provisions have a 
limited field of application. 14 Only the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality under Article 18(1) TFEU and the specific provisions reserved by it15 
applies in all fields of Union law. 
As a result, even though today the legislative development of the body of EU 
non-discrimination law has reached a point where it would be difficult to compile a 
6 Joined Cases C-22108 and C-23/08 Athanasios Vatsouras (C-22108) and Josif Koupatantze (C-
23/08) v Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) Niirnberg 900 [2009] ECR I-4585, para 52. 
7 Commission Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ 2000 L 180/22. 
8 Commission Directive 2000178/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ 2000 L 303/16. 
9 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on 
part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ 1998 L 14/9. 
1° Council Directive 1999170/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on 
fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, OJ 1999 L 175/43. 
11 Directive 1999/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the charging of heavy 
goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, OJ 1999 L 187/42. 
12 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents, OJ 2004 L 16/44. 
13 See e.g. in Case C-13/05 Sonia Chac6n Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006) ECR I-6467 
(disability does not include sickness); Case C-310/10 Ministerul Justifiei ~i Libertdfilor 
Cetarene~ti v ~tefan Agafirei and Others, judgment of 7 July 2011, n.y.r. (alleged discrimination 
against judges is based on a socio-professional category which is not covered by Directives 2000/ 
43 and 2000178). 
14 See e.g. Joined Cases C-63/91 and C-64/9 1 Sonia Jackson and Patricia Cresswell v Chief 
Adjudication Officer (1992] ECR 1-477 (poverty is not a risk covered by Community sociaJ 
insurance law that prohibits sex discrimination). 
15 According to the General Court, these even include the competition rules; Case T-158/99 
Thermenhotel Sroiser Franz Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Others v Commission [2004] ECR 
II-1, para 147; compare Van Gerven 1971, p. 414 et seq. 
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comprehensive list of all relevant provisions, 16 the protection against discrimi-
nation remains limited. This raises the question of whether gaps can be filled 
through the application of general principles of equality. In this context, it is useful 
to look back to the time when the process of building the layered system of 
equality law began, precisely, against the background of the lack, or limited reach, 
of written law in force at the time. 
3 The Construction of the Multi-level Architecture 
of Equality 
It is often assumed that the genesis of the Union's general principles of equality 
began with the Court's decision in Ruckdeschel, 17 an agricultural case. However, 
the first steps were taken in the different context of staff law at a time when the 
Staff Regulations contained no non-discrimination provision. It is worth tracing 
this development in some detail, since it is these early cases that laid the 
groundwork for the different effect of the Union's general principles with respect 
to actions by the Union institutions, on the one hand, and Union law applicable in 
the Member States, on the other. 
3.1 The General Principle of Equality Tout Court 
3.1.1 The Staff Case Bernardi (1971) 
In the present writer's analysis, the first decision in which the Court recognised the 
existence of a general principle of equality is Bernardi. 18 In this case, an official of 
the European Parliament complained about the temporary posting of a colleague as 
a translator for two Parliament sessions in Strasbourg, instead of giving travel 
orders to him. Whilst Advocate General Roemer did not mention equality in his 
16 See e.g. the categorisations by Timmermans 1982, p. 429, and the list by Lenaerts 1991, 
pp. 39-41. It might be added that non-discrimination provisions are not always immediately 
recognisable as such. Article 63(1) TFEU is a case in point. It replaces Article 67(1) of the EEC 
Treaty, which prohibited both 'restrictions' on the free movement of capital and 'discriminations 
based on the nationality or the place of residence of the parties and the place where the capital is 
invested'. Whilst Article 40 of the EEA Agreement retains this wording, Article 63(1) TFEU 
merely mentions restrictions. However, according to the Court these two provisions are 
'substantially identical'; e.g. Case C-10/10 Commission v Austria, judgment of 16 June 2011, 
n.y.r., para 42. 
11 Joined Cases 117176 and 16177 Alberc Ruckdeschel & Co. and Hansa-Lagerhaus Srroh & Co. 
v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen and Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1977] ECR 1753. 
18 Case 48170 Giorgio Bernardi v European Parliament [1971] ECR 175. 
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opinion, the Court held that, unless justified in the interests of the service, the 
conferring of the advantages flowing from the postings in question on certain 
officials ' is capable of adversely affecting their immediate colleagues because it 
infringes the principles of equality of treatment and of objectivity which must 
govern the public service' (Bernardi, para 27). 
Given that the Staff Regulations at the time contained no non-discrimination 
provision that could have been relied on by Mr Bernardi, the Court's reference to 
the 'principle of equality of treatment' must be read as recognition of the existence 
of a general principle that filled the gap. Later, the Court referred to its 'consistent 
case-law', according to which 'the general principle of equality is one of the 
fundamental principles of the law of the Community civil service [which] requires 
that comparable situations shall not be treated differently unless such differentia-
tion is objectively justified' (Ferrario, 19 para 7). It is clear that this principle is the 
general principle of equality tout court, i.e. an equality principle unrelated to a 
particular discrimination ground. It is simply a 'principle of equal treatment of the 
various servants', to borrow the words of the applicant in the earlier staff case 
Huber20 (in which the Court did not enter into the substance of the argument). 
3.1.2 Outside Staff Law: Frilli (1972) and Ruckdeschel (1977) 
Following Bernardi, the Court recognised the existence of the general principle of 
equality tout court outside the realm of staff law first in FrillP1 and subsequently 
in Ruckdeschel. Frilli concerned the right of a retired migrant worker with a very 
small pension to a guaranteed income for old people under Belgian law. In 
addition to specific questions under Community social security law, the case also 
raised issues in relation to the fact that under Belgian law the benefit to a foreign 
worker depended on the existence of a reciprocal agreement with the Member 
State of which the worker was a national. The Court held that "such a condition is 
incompatible with the rule of equality which is one of the fundamental principles 
of Community law" (Frilli, para 19). 
In Ruckdeschel, the issue of discrimination arose because the Community 
institutions, in the context of the common organisation of the market in cereals in 
force at the time, had abolished production refunds previously granted to a product 
called quellmehl while maintaining them with respect to a product in competition 
with quellmehl, namely maize-based starch. The Council argued that the fact that 
the products in question were not identical ruled out any possibility of discrimi-
nation. Advocate General Capotorti disagreed. He thought that under the terms of 
Article 40 of the EEC Treaty a comparison could very well be made between 
19 Joined Cases 152, 158, 162, 166, 170, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 182 and 186/81 W. Ferrario 
and Others v Commission [ 1983] ECR 2357. 
2° Case 78/63 Remy Huber v Commission [1964] ECR English special edition 367. 
21 Case 1172 Rita Frilli v Belgian State [1972] ECR 457. 
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producers of different products, provided that the products were substitutable. The 
Court, however, did not rely on that provision. It noted that this provision, whilst it 
clearly prohibited any discrimination between producers of the same product, did 
not refer in such clear terms to the relationship between different industrial or trade 
sectors in the sphere of processed agricultural products. However, according to the 
Court (Ruckdeschel, para 7): ' (t]his does not alter the fact that the prohibition of 
discrimination laid down in the aforesaid provision is merely a specific enunciation 
of the general principle of equality which is one of the fundamental principles of 
Community law. This principle requires that similar situations shall not be treated 
differently unless differentiation is objectively justified. ' In the case at hand, the 
Court found the abolition of the refund for quellmehl, while maintaining it for 
starch, 'incompatible with the principle of equality' (operative part of the 
judgment). 
Lenaerts22 observed that Ruckdeschel 'institue [ ... ]par la voie jurisprudentielle 
une regle de droit superieure non ecrite d'application generale' . Indeed, Ruck-
deschel confirmed that a general principle of equality existed not only in the 
Communities' staff law, but also outside this specific realm. In this context, it 
should be noted that the Court's statement in the above-quoted paragraph is not 
limited to the legality of actions by Community institutions, but rather refers to 
Community law in general, i.e. also to law applicable in the Member States. In 
Klensch,23 the Court explicitly confirmed the binding effect of the general prin-
ciple of equality tout court on the Member States where they implement EU 
agricultural law. 
3.2 General Principles of Equality with a Particular Focus 
Perhaps more surprising than the recognition of a general principle of equality tout 
court was the recognition of general principles of equality related to specific 
grounds. Whilst the former had long been part of the Member States' constitu-
tional traditions,24 the same was not true for the latter. Again, the starting point for 
the Court's case-law on this matter can be found in staff law. It concerned alleged 
sex discrimination. 
22 Lenaerts 1991, p. 6. 
23 Joined Cases 201 and 202/85 Marthe Klensch and others v Secretaire d'Etat a /'Agriculture et 
ii la Viticulture [1986) ECR 3477. 
24 Unsurprisingly from that point of view, certain early academic writers saw Article 4(b) of the 
ECSC Treaty as an expression of this national principle; e.g. Burner 1965, p. 218, compare also 
Zuleeg 1992. 
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3.2.1 The General Principle of Equality with Respect to Sex 
The Staff Case Sabbatini (1972) 
The existence of a general principle of equality with respect to sex was first 
recognised in Sabbatini,25 though somewhat implicitly. The case concerned an 
official of the European Parliament who complained about the refusal of her 
employer to grant her an expatriation allowance on the ground that, after her 
marriage, she was no longer the head of her household. This was based on a 
provision of the Staff Regulations according to which an official marrying a person 
who at the date of marriage did not qualify for the allowance forfeited the right to 
the allowance unless the official thereby became the head of household. A further 
provision resulted in a married male official being deemed the head of household. 
Ms Sabbatini complained about sex discrimination. Since the Staff Regulations 
contained no prohibition of discrimination that could have been applied to the 
case, she relied both on an alleged general principle of law prohibiting any dis-
crimination on the ground of sex and on what was then Article 119 of the EEC 
Treaty on equal pay for men and women (now Article 157(1) and (2) TFEU). 
In his opinion in the case (and in the parallel case Chollet)?6 Advocate General 
Roemer took the view that no general principle of the kind argued by Ms Sabbatini 
existed in the laws of the Member States. Instead, he seemed to suggest the 
application of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, by analogy. According to the 
Advocate General, even though the contested rule did not formally distinguish 
between male and female officials, it nevertheless manifestly drew a distinction 
between the sexes since the status of head of household was determined according 
to sex. However, he considered this justified based on economic, sociological and 
psychological considerations, in particular the pre-eminence granted to the hus-
band at the time by the family law of most Member States. The Court did not 
agree, holding that the Staff Regulations 'cannot [ ... ) treat officials differently 
according to whether they are male or female, since termination of the status of 
expatriate must be dependent for both male and female officials on uniform cri-
teria, irrespective of sex' (Sabbatini, para 12). According to the Court, the only 
acceptable reason for refusing the allowance was the case where the marriage 
brought to an end the state of expatriation itself (and thereby the very basis for the 
allowance)?7 
Sabbatini is the first case where the Court found indirect sex discrimination. 
However, the judgment is not clear about the legal basis for this finding, nor is 
Airola,28 a subsequent staff case where the unfavourable treatment of women was 
25 Case 2017 I Luisa Sabbatini, nee Bertoni, v Parliament [1972] ECR 345. 
26 Case 32/71 Monique Chollet, nee Bauduin, v Commission [1972] ECR 363. 
27 At the time of the Sabbatini judgment, the Court did not yet interpret the concept of indirect 
discrimination as including the element of objective justification; Tobler 2005, p. 184 et seq. 
28 Case 21174 Jeanne Airola v Commission [1975] ECR 221. 
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caused through reliance on the official's nationality as determined by the marriage 
state. Commentators29 at the time argued that the Court must have relied on an 
unwritten general principle of non-discrimination or equality specifically on the 
ground of sex. Subsequently, the Court in Razzouk and Beydoun30 (para 16) 
explicitly spoke about 'the principle of equal treatment of both sexes' that applies 
in the Community civil service, and added that this principle is not limited to the 
requirements under the Union's sex equality law applicable in the Member States 
(i.e. Article 119 of the EEC Treaty and the Directives then in force). 
The special approach in Sabbatini and Airola becomes evident when compared 
with that in Prais,31 which concerned staff recruitment competitions and disad-
vantageous treatment on the ground of religion. Here, no general principle was 
necessary in order to fill a gap, since Article 27 of the Staff Regulations provided 
that officials were to be selected without reference to race, creed or sex. 32 The 
Court held that, where a candidate informs the appointing authority that religious 
reasons make certain dates impossible for him or her, the decision to nevertheless 
hold a recruitment competition on such a date infringes Article 27 of the Staff 
Regulations and 'the freedom of religion as embodied in the European Convention 
on Human Rights and thus part of the fundamental rights recognised in Com-
munity law' (Prais, para 18). Given the existence of Article 27 of the Staff 
Regulations, the Court in its reasoning could give it the place that in Sabbatini and 
Airola had been taken by the general principle of equality with respect to sex. The 
reference to the freedom of religion then simply underlined the importance of the 
written provision. 
Outside Staff Law: Defrenne Ill (1978) 
Outside staff law, the existence of a general principle of equality with respect to sex 
first emerged from Defrenne Il I. 33 At issue were the different retirement ages imposed 
by the Belgian airline Sabena on air stewardesses and (male) air stewards and the 
financial consequences of the early dismissal for a stewardess. Ms Defrenne' s action 
before the Belgian courts led to three preliminary rulings. In the third of these, the 
national court asked (among other things), whether, outside the scope of Article 119 of 
the EEC Treaty, Community law contained a general principle prohibiting discrimi-
nation based on sex as regards conditions of employment in the Member States. 
29 Streil 1975, p. 322; Massaro 1976, pp. 530-531. 
30 Joined Cases 75 and 117/82 C. Raz;zouk and A. Beydoun v Commission [1984] ECR 1509. 
31 Case 130175 Vivien Prais v Council [1976] ECR 1589. 
32 Note that the general principles of equa1it) apply fully to EU personnel not covered by the 
Staff Regulations; see Case C-485/08 P Claudia Gualtieri v Commission [2010] ECR I-3009. 
33 Case 149177 Gabrielle Defrenne v Societe anonyme beige de navigation aerienne Sabena 
[1978] ECR 1365 (Defrenne Ill). In Case 43175 Gabrielle Defrenne v Societe anonyme beige de 
navigation aerienne Sabena [I 976] ECR 455 (Defrenne If) , para 12, the Court had already stated 
that "the principle of equal pay forms part of the foundations of the Community". 
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Again, this question has to be seen against the background of a gap. At the material 
time there was no written Community law on the issue at hand (dismissal) but only on 
remuneration. 
In this situation, Ms Defrenne tried to rely on Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, 
arguing that it is 'only a specific statement of a general principle against dis-
crimination which had found many expressions in the Treaty' and, therefore, must 
be given a wide interpretation so as to cover dismissal (Defrenne Ill, para 6). In 
other words, her argument was that of a general non-discrimination (equality) 
principle tout court. The Court was more specific. Though ultimately refusing Ms 
Defrenne's claim, it did recognise the existence of a general principle of equality 
with respect to sex.34 Having stated that respect for fundamental personal human 
rights is one of the general principles of Community law, it added that 'there can 
be no doubt that the elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of those 
fundamental rights' (Defrenne Ill, para 27). Much later, the Court explicitly 
referred to the 'general principle of equality of the sexes' in the context of 
Community law outside staff law (Lindoifer, 35 para 50). 
However, different from the staff cases discussed above, the confirmation of the 
existence of such a principle did not mean that Ms Defrenne could rely on it. 
While recognising the need to ensure sex equality in working conditions for 
Community officials in the context of the Staff Regulations (and referring in this 
context to Sabbatini and Airola), the Court pointed out that, as far as Community 
law to be applied in the Member States was concerned, the Community at the 
material time 'had not ( ... ] assumed any responsibility for supervising and guar-
anteeing the observance of the principle of equality between men and women in 
relation to working conditions other than remuneration' (Defrenne Ill, para 30). 
From this, it concluded that Ms Defrenne's case, insofar as it did not concern pay, 
was outside the scope of Community law. 
This means that already in the 1970s the juxtaposition of two types of cases-
namely action by the institutions on the one hand and the application of Union law 
in the Member States on the other-showed the effect of a general (equality) 
principle depending on the addressees. First, it follows from Sabbatini and Airola 
that the institutions are generally bound by the Union's general principles of 
equality, as later explicitly confirmed in cases such as Rinke36 (para 28), according 
to which 'compliance with the prohibition of[ ... ] discrimination on the ground of 
sex is a condition governing the legality of all measures adopted by the (Union] 
institutions' . In contrast, Defrenne Ill shows that the Member States and indi-
viduals (e.g. employers) are bound by the Union's general principles of equality) 
only where there is Union law that brings the issue at hand within the scope of that 
34 See e.g. Pemice 1979, p. 414. Compare however O'Leary 2011, p. 775. 
35 Case C-227/04 P Maria-Luise Lindorfer v Council [2007) ECR I-6767. 
36 Case C-25/02 Katharina Rinke v Arztekammer Hamburg [2003) ECR I-8349. 
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law, or, in the helpful wording of Ellis, where the general principle can be 
'attached' to Union law? 7 
3.2.2 General Principles of Equality on Other Grounds 
The recognition by the Court of the existence of general principles of equality in 
respects other than sex followed only much later. In Mangold (paras 74 and 75), 
the Court recognised the existence of a general principle of equality with re~pect to 
age, religion or belief, disability and sexual orientation. In relation to sexual 
orientation, the existence of such a principle was subsequently confirmed in 
Rome?8 (paras 59 and 60). In the context of Euratom law, where there is no 
equivalent to Article 18(1) TFEU, the Court in CEZ39 (para 89) recognised the 
existence of a general principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality. 
However, the list of such principles that might be recognised by the Court in the 
future is not boundless. Audiolux40 is a case in point. It concerned the protection of 
minority shareholders in the event of other shareholders acquiring or strengthening 
their control of a company. In its reference for a preliminary ruling, the national 
court asked whether the existence of a general principle of equality with respect to 
minority shareholders can be deduced from specific provisions of secondary 
company law on equal treatment and protection of minority shareholders (these 
provisions did not apply to the case at hand). In other words, the question was 
whether these specific provisions are expressions of a 'larger' general principle. 
This the Court denied, observing 'that the mere fact that secondary Community 
legislation lays down certain provisions relating to the protection of minority 
shareholders is not sufficient in itself to establish the existence of a general 
principle of Community law, in particular if the scope of those provisions is 
limited to rights which are well-defined and certain. Therefore, in examining the 
provisions mentioned by the national court, the sole purpose is to ascertain whe-
ther they give any conclusive indications of the existence of such a principle. In 
that connection, it must be stated that only if those provisions are drafted so as to 
have binding effect [ ... ], will those provisions have indicatiYe value showing the 
well-defined content of the principle concerned [ ... ]' (Audiolux, para 34). In the 
case at hand, the Court found that the relevant provisions in secondary law were 
too specific to allow the conclusion of the existence of a general principle of 
37 Ellis and Watson 2012, p. 344; further Rastrelli 1979, p. 140 
38 Case C-147/08 Jurgen Romer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, judgment of 10 May 2011, 
n.y.r. 
39 Case C-115/08 Land Oberosterreich v CEZ as [2009) ECR 1-265. 
4° Case C-101/08 Audiolux SA e.a v Groupe Bruxe/les Lambert SA (GBL) and Others and 
Bertelsmann AG and Others [20091 ECR I-9823. 
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equality with respect to minority shareholders.4 1 From this, it must be concluded 
that not every written non-discrimination provision is an expression of a general 
principle. At the same time, Audiolux shows that where there is no general prin-
ciple of equality with respect to a particular ground, the general principle of 
1. . 1 42 equa Jty tout court remams re evant. 
3.3 Links Between the Layers and with the Charter 
Returning to the overall picture of the Union's multi-level architecture of equality, 
the Court's case-law shows that the different layers of this system are linked to 
each other. Firstly, the written prohibitions of discrimination are specific expres-
sions of the general principles of equality. From a logical point of view, it is clear 
that written provisions without a discrimination ground can only be linked to the 
general principle of equality tout court. Accordingly, the Court stated in Royal 
Scholten-Honig43 (para 26) that what is today Article 40(2) TFEU on agricultural 
law 'is merely a specific enunciation of the general principle of equality'. As for 
those provisions that do refer to a particular discrimination ground, again from a 
logical perspective their first link is to the general principle of equality with respect 
to the relevant ground. Thus, the Court stated for example in Kuciikdeveci (para 
27) that 'the general principle of European Union law prohibiting all discrimi-
nation on grounds of age ' is given expression in Directive 2000178 in the domain 
of employment and occupation. 
Secondly, the general principles of equality with a specific focus can be seen as 
specific expressions of the general principle of equality tout court. In that sense, it is 
also possible to conceive of written prohibitions of discrimination as specific expres-
sions of this latter principle. For example, in Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsburu:f-4 
(para 59), the Court called the principle of equal pay for men and women under Article 
41 E.g. Bcngoetxea 2010, p. 1184. Some commentators point out that one complication lies in the 
fact that most of the specific provisions at issue concern the relationship between the company 
and its shareholders, whilst Audiolux concerns the relationship between different shareholders; 
e.g. Wilsing and Paul 2009, p. 756; Mucciarelli 2010, p. 162 et seq. 
42 Having denied the existence of a general principle of equality with regard to minority 
shareholders, the Court in Audiolux proceeded to examine whether the general principle of 
equality tout court requires equal treatment of minority shareholders by a shareholder acquiring 
or strengthening his control of a company. This the Court denied, stating in particular that 'the 
general principle of equal treatment cannot in itself either give rise to a particular obligation on 
the part of the dominant shareholder in favour of the other shareholders or determine the specific 
situation to which such an obligation relates' (para 57). 
43 Joined Cases 103 and 145177 Royal Scholten-Honig (Holdings) Limited v Intervention Board 
for Agricultural Produce; Tunnel Refineries Limited v Intervention Board for Agricultural 
Produce [ 1978) ECR 2037. 
44 Case C-220/02 Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft der Privatangesteliten v 
Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich [2004] ECR I-5907. 
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157(1) TFEU and Directive 2006/54 a specific expression of ' the principle of non-
discrimination', without referring to sex.45 In other cases, the Court appears to combine 
the three layers. In CEZ (paras 89 and 91) the Court explained its finding that 'the 
principle of prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality' is a general 
principle which is also applicable under the law of the Atomic Energy Community, by 
pointing out that what is today Article 18(1) TFEU 'is a specific expression of the 
general principle of equality'. Though not illogical in the perspective of the overall 
system, it is nevertheless submitted that it would be helpful if the Court were to 
distinguish more clearly between the individual layers. 
Thirdly, the Court's more recent case-law has confirmed that Articles 20 
(equality before the law), 21 (non-discrimination) and 23 (equality between men 
and women) of the Charter are part of the Union's multi-level architecture of 
equality. According to the Explanations on the Charter, Article 20 'corresponds to 
a general principle of law which is included in all European constitutions and has 
also been recognised by the Court of Justice as a basic principle of Community 
law' . In Chatzi46 (paras 63 and 64), the Court confirmed that the fundamental 
nature of the principle of equal treatment as one of the general principles of 
European Union law 'is affirmed in Article 20 of the Charter' and continued to 
state: '[t]his principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated 
differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless 
such treatment is objectively justified'. Importantly, this definition shows that in 
spite of its wording, Article 20 is not about 'equality before the law' understood in 
a traditional sense (i.e. equal application of the law to all, whatever the content of 
the law)47 but indeed the broad principle as previously recognised in its case-law. 
In Sayn-Wittgenstein48 (para 89), the Court stated that 'the principle of equal 
treatment' is 'also enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights' 
(see also Nagy,49 para 47). 
In the context of Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter, the Explanations on the 
Charter do not mention general principles of equality. However, the Court 
observed in Prigge50 (para 38) that 'the prohibition of all discrimination on 
grounds, inter alia, of age is incorporated in Article 21 of the Charter', and in 
45 Similarly already Case C-132/92 Birds Eye Walls Led. v Friedel M. Roberts [1993] ECR I-
5579, para 17; Case C-2181980umar Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Regie nationale des usines 
Renault SA [1999] ECR 1-5723, para 16, and Case C-320!00 A. G. Lawrence and Others v 
Regent Office Care Lid, Commercial Catering Group and Mitie Secure Services Ltd. [2002] ECR 
I-7325, para 12. 
46 Case C-149110 Zoi Chatzi v lpourgos Ikonomikon, judgment of 16 December 2010, n.y.r. 
47 E.g. Vierdag 1973, pp. 16-17. 
48 Case C-208/09 /lonka Sayn-Wiugenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, judgment of 22 
December 2010, n.y.r. 
49 Case C-21110 Karoly Nagy v Mezogazdasdgi es Videkfejlesztesi Hivatal, judgment of 21 July 
2011, n.y.r. 
50 Case C-447/09 Reinhard Prigge, Michael Fromm, Volker Lambach v Deutsche LufthansaAG, 
judgment of 13 September 2011, n.y.r. 
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Hennigs and Mai51 (para 46) that 'the principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of age' is 'enshrined in primary law in Article 21 of the Charter'. Here, too, 
equality 'requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, and 
different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is 
objectively justified' (Test-Achats,52 para 28 read in conjunction with para 17, in 
the context of Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter).53 
It may be concluded that whilst Article 20 corresponds to the general principle 
of equality tout court, Articles 21 and 23 reflect general principles of equality with 
respect to particular grounds (keeping in mind, however, that the Charter is 
addressed only to the institutions of the Union and to the Union's Member States). 
4 Relevance and Meaning 
4.1 Relevance of the General Principles of Equality in Practice 
In the system of Union law, the general principles have constitutional status 
(Audiolux, para 63). Whether a prohibition of discrimination derived from a 
general principle applies in a practical case depends on the situation. Firstly, in 
cases where the legality or validity of a measure of secondary law or its inter-
pretation consistent with primary law is at issue, and where there is an applicable 
superior non-discrimination rule in the written law other than Articles 20, 21 and 
23 of the Charter, such as for example Article 40(2) TFEU, there is no room, and 
no need, to apply a general principle. Conversely, where there is no such law, a 
general principle of equality will be the benchmark for the analysis (Ruckdeschel, 
Test-Achats). The same is true where equality is relied on as a justification for 
restricting another right (e.g. Sayn-Wittgenstein). In such cases, the general prin-
ciple of equality tout court will be relevant where there is no general principle of 
equality with particular focus (e.g. Ruckdeschel, Sayn-Wittgenstein). Otherwise, 
the relevant principle with a particular focus will apply (e.g. Test-Achats, in 
relation to sex). In the latter context, the particular focus has the advantage of 
implying that the relevant ground by itself (i.e. in the context of Test-Achats the 
mere difference in sex between female and male holders of insurance policies) 
cannot be relied on in order to argue non-comparability.54 
51 Joined Cases C-297/10 and C-298110 Sabine Hennigs (C-297110) v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and 
Land Berlin (C-298/10) v Alexander Mai, judgment of 8 September 2011, n.y.r. 
52 Case C-236/09 Association Beige des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v 
Conseil des ministres, judgment of 1 March 2011 (Grand Chamber), n.y.r. 
53 See e.g. Tobler 20lla, p. 2051, with further references. 
54 Regarding the issue of comparability in Test-Achats, see section "The Elusive Concept of 
Comparability." 
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Secondly and similarly, in cases that do not concern the legality or validity of a 
measure of secondary law, written non-discrimination law will be relevant insofar 
as it covers the matter at issue. Where a gap needs to be filled and actions of the 
institutions are at issue, the general principles of equality recognised by the Court 
can apply without further ado (e.g. Bernardi, Sabbatini). In contrast, where a case 
concerns Union law to be applied in the Member States, the situation is more 
complex, since here the application of a general principle of equality requires that 
this principle can be attached to some other EU law. As already noted, this was not 
possible in Defrenne Ill, and neither was it in the more recent cases of Chac6n 
Navas55 and Bartsch. 56 This means that in these cases the applicants could not 
invoke a general principle of equality in order to argue that they were the victims 
of discrimination prohibited under Union Jaw. 
In other contexts, such an argument has proven to be possible. One interesting 
example concerns EU citizenship, where cases such as Pusa51 and Gaumain-
Cerri58 can be read as based on the general principle of equality tout court (rather 
than on Article 18(1) TFEU), which is attached to Article 21(1) TFEU, in order to 
allow the Union citizens to complain about unequal treatment by their own 
Member State on the ground of having exercised free movement rights.59 How-
ever, since the Court began to interpret Article 21(1) TFEU as implying a pro-
hibition of restrictions,60 this construction has no longer been necessary.61 
More recently, the Court has found discrimination based on a general principle 
of equality in a series of cases involving age discrimination, among which notably 
Mangold and Kiiciikdeveci. In the former, the Court attached the general principle 
of equality with respect to age to the Fixed-Term Work Directive, and in the latter 
55 Case C-13/05 Sonia Chac6n Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR I-6467 (there is 
nothing in Union law to which the general principle of equality tout court could be attached in 
such a manner as to prohibit disadvantageous treatment on the ground of sickness). 
56 Case C-427/06 Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeri:ite (BSH) Altersfiirsorge GmbH 
[2008] ECR I-7245 (there is nothing in Union law to which the general principle of equality with 
respect to age could be attached where a matter falling within the scope of Directive 2000n8 
arises before the end of the period for the implementation of that Directive in the Member States). 
57 Case C-224/02 Heikki Antero Pusa v Osuuspankkien Keskini:iinen Vakuutusyhtio [2004] ECR 
I-5763. 
58 Joined Cases C-502101 and C-31/02 Silke Gaumain-Cerri v Kaufmiinnische Krankenkasse-
Pj/egekasse and Maria Barth v Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinprovinz [2004] ECR 1-6483. 
59 Tobler 2005, p. 364 et seq. 
60 E.g. Case C-406/04 Gerald De Cuyper v Office national de l'emploi [2006] ECR I-6947. 
61 These days, the Court's case-law deals with discriminations on grounds of nationality by one's 
own Member State under the concept of restrictions; see also Mei 2009, p. 280. More generally, 
differences in treatment other than those on the ground of nationality by the host Member State 
may amount to restrictions; see e.g. the different tax treatment of dividends received by non-
resident and resident pension funds under the law on the free movement of capital in Case C-493/ 
09 Commission v Portugal, judgment of 6 October 2011, n.y.r., para 30. If seen in this manner, it 
is not necessary to examine all citizenship cases involving different treatment in the light of 
equality, as appears to be done by e.g. Amadeo 2011. 
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to Directive 2000178.62 However, as the present writer has argued in a different 
context,63 in such cases an additional element must be taken into account when 
considering the relevance of the general principles of equality. Under the Tedeschi 
principle,64 rules of primary law can apply only in the absence of more specific 
secondary law. Decisively, according to the Court, Directive 2000178 does not 
constitute such a specific measure with respect to the general principles of equality 
relating to religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. It merely 
provides for a 'general framework' for the implementation of the prohibitions of 
discrimination at issue. In other words, the prohibitions in the Directive are merely 
declaratory and for that reason do not fill the gap on the level of the secondary law. 
In Ki.i.ci.ikdeveci (para 27), the Court in the context of age discrimination explicitly 
confirmed that, where an allegation of such discrimination concerns a matter 
within the scope of EU law, ' it is the general principle of European Union law 
prohibiting all discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression in Directive 
2000178, which must be the basis of the examination of whether European Union 
law precludes national legislation'. 
In cases where there is EU law to which the general principle of equality with 
respect to age could be attached, this approach has allowed the Court to avoid 
notably the issue of the lack of horizontal effect of Directives, by instead relying 
on the primacy of the general principle65 in a situation involving a legal conflict 
between individuals.66 However, it remains to be seen whether the same approach 
can be applied in a different context. Given that the Court's reasoning with respect 
to the merely declaratory nature of Directive 2000178 appears to be based on the 
nature of that Directive as providing no more than a 'general framework', it is 
doubtful that it can be transposed to many other measures of the Union' s sec-
ondary law.67 Arguably, this is confirmed by the Court's approach in Domin-
guez,68 which avoids a Mangold-ty pe construction even though the case concerned 
an issue (namely the right to annual leave) that appears both in EU secondary 
62 This link has been particularly heavily criticised; e.g. De Mol 2011, p. 126. 
63 Tobler 201 lb, p. 98 et seq. 
64 Case 5-77 Carlo Tedeschi v Denkavit Commerciale s.r.l. [1977] ECR 1555, para 35. 
65 See the reference to Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA 
(1978] ECR 629 in Mangold, para 77. 
66 Mangold was the first case to do so. Earlier cases on the horizontal effect of prohibitions of 
discrimination concerned ~'ritten law, rather than general principles of equality; e.g. Case 43/75 
Gabriel/e Defrcnne v Societe anonyme beige de navigation aerienne Sabena (1976] ECR 455 
(Defrenne ll), regarding what is today Article 157(1) TFEU (equal pay for men and women 
workers), and Case C-28 1198 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000) ECR 
l-4139, regarding Article 45 TFEU (free movement for workers). 
67 Other examples of this type of 'framework' Directives (though not 'general framework' 
Directives) might be Directive 2000/43 (see Article 1) and Directive 2004/11 3 (see Article 1); see 
again Tobler 20 llb. 
68 Case C-282110 Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest At/antique and 
Prefer de la region Centre, judgment of 24 January 2012, n.y.r., paras 121- 134 of the Advocate 
General's opinion. 
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law)69 and in the Charter, and even though Advocate General Trstenjak in her 
opinion discussed the possibility of such an approach.70 
4.2 The Meaning of the Prohibition of Discrimination Under 
a General Principle of Equality 
4.2.1 Basic Definitions and Operationalisation Through Written La\\ 
The basic definitions of equality and discrimination under EU law show that the 
Court' s understanding of these concepts is based on the so-called Aristotelian 
model.71 According to settled case-law, the principle of equality or equal treatment 
'requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that dif-
ferent situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is 
objectively justified' (e.g. Arcelor,72 para 23,73 and, in the context of Article 20 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Chatzi, para 64). As for discrimination, it 'can 
arise only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the 
application of the same rule to different situations' (e.g. Commission v Hungary,74 
para 50).75 
69 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ 2003 L 299/9. 
70 Whilst the Court called the right to paid annual leave as stated in the Directive 'a particularly 
important principle of European Union social law' (Dominguez, para 16), it discussed neither the 
existence of a general principle on this issue nor its relationship with the Directive and with 
Article 31 (2) of the Charter. In the present writer's analysis, the Mangold approach requires both 
the existence of a general principle and room for its application under the Tedeschi principle. 
7 1 E.g. More 1993, p. 53. It should be noted that the prohibition of harassment under the Union's 
social law is based on a different approach; see Holtmaat 2009. 
72 Case C-127/07 Societe Arcelor At/antique et Lorraine and Others v Premier ministre, 
Ministre de l'Ecologie et du Developpement durable and Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et 
de l'Industrie [2008] ECR l-9895. 
73 An early indication that equality may require different (rather than same) treatment can be 
found in Case 15/57 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (1957-1958] ECR 211, p. 230. 
74 Case C-253/09 Commission v Hungary, judgment of 1 December 2011, n.y.r. In the seminal 
Case 13/63 Italy v Commission [1963) ECR 165, the Coun in this context referred to 
'discrimination in substance', as opposed to discrimination in form. 
75 In the most recent generation of non-discrimination legislation, where there are legal 
definitions of discrimination, comparability is only mentioned in the context of direct 
discrimination. Seen that in the Court's case-law comparability is also relevant in the context 
of indirect discrimination, it has been argued that to require it also in the context of indirect 
discrimination is dogmalically unsound and should be abandoned; Schiek 2007, p. 468 et seq. 
However, there appears to be no case-law that would confirm such a change in approach. 
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In practice, the main problem with this approach lies in the fact that its con-
stitutive elements, namely comparability and justification, remain undefined?6 As 
in other legal systems, the prohibition of discrimination under Union law is made 
more concrete through written law. For example, such law may contain specific 
elements concerning comparability (e.g. the reference to 'equal work or work of 
equal value' in Article 157(1) TFEU77 or the definition of the 'comparable per-
manent worker' under clause 3 of the Framework Agreement attached to Directive 
1999170). Further, it may explicitly distinguish between direct and indirect dis-
crimination (e.g. Article 7(3) of Directive 1999/62) or even give legal definitions 
of these and other forms of discrimination (e.g. Article 2 of Directive 2000178). 
Also, written law may limit the possibilities to justify discrimination. As a rule, 
justification for direct discrimination under written law is based on a closed system 
(i.e. direct discrimination can be justified exclusively based on the grounds listed 
in the law,78 as opposed to indirect discrimination where the much broader pos-
sibility of objective justification is inherent in the modern definition of the con-
cept). In contrast, in some contexts written law provides for the possibility of 
objective justification even with respect to direct discrimination. The best-known 
example is probably Article 6(1) of Directive 2000178, concerning age discrimi-
nation (though the Court's case-law has specified that here objective justification is 
limited to social policy objectives)? 9 Finally, written provisions may contain 
specific rules on matters of enforcement such as proof (which must be distin-
guished from the existence of justification),80 remedies and sanctions. 
The degree of operationalisation through written law as well as its specific 
content may differ depending on the area of Union law. Some prohibitions of dis-
crimination remain close to the general principle of equality tout court, for example 
Article 40(2) TFEU, which merely specifies those who benefit from the prohibition. 
Most other provisions are more specific, though on the level of the TFEU even basic 
aspects remain based on the Court's case-law (for example the distinction between 
direct and indirect discrimination and the requirements of proof in this context under 
the Treaty rules on free movement, with the exception of Article 200(5) TFEU).81 
76 See e.g. Westen 1982 and Fredman 2011 , p. 8 et seq. 
77 Though it should be noted that this does not exclude other elements of comparability; see e.g. 
Case C-218/98 Oumar Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Regie nationale des usines Renault SA 
[1999) ECR I-5723 and Case C-19/02 Viktor Hlozek v Roche Austria Gesellschaft mbH [2004] 
ECR l-11491. 
78 E.g. Case C-64/08 Ernst Engelmann, judgment of 9 September 2010, n.y.r., para 34. 
79 Prigge, paras 34 and 81. Other examples where objective justification is possible for direct 
discrimination concern part-time work and fixed-term work under clauses 4 of the relevant 
Framework Agreements and direct sex discrimination under Article 4(5) of Council Directive 
2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men 
and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ 2004 L 373/37. 
80 See Case C-54/07 Cemrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma 
Feryn NV [2008] ECR I-5187, paras 29-40 (proof), as compared to paras 21- 28 (existence of 
discrimination). 
81 Case C-237/94 John O'Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996) ECR I-2617. 
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The by far most developed legislation sterns mainly from the social field (Directives 
2000/43, 2000178, 2004/113, 2006/54 and 2010/41).82 Much of this modern law 
codifies case-law of the Court, though more recent case-law has yet again added 
interesting elements, such as the recognition of discrimination by association83 and a 
notable shift of the boundary between direct and indirect discrimination.84 
4.2.2 The Prohibition of Discrimination Under a General Principle 
of Equality 
Different from the written law just mentioned, the definition of discrimination in 
the context of the general principles of equality generally revolves around com-
parability and objective justification. It has been observed that on this level 
equality is 'a loose principle that amounts to little more than a general standard of 
fairness and rationality' .85 
The Elusive Concept of Comparability 
Comparability in particular has proven to be an elusive concept. Where Union law 
prohibits not only discrimination but also restrictions, as is the case in the areas of 
free movement and Union citizenship, it may be possible to avoid it.86 This is, 
however, not possible in the context of the general principles of equality. First, 
where the claim is one for equal (same) treatment, there is the need to find a 
comparator that is suitable for the purposes of the case at hand. 87 Second, since by 
82 Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the 
application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in 
a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC, OJ 2010 L 180/1. 
83 Case C-303/06 S. Coleman v Allridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-5603. 
84 E.g. Case C-196/02 Vasiliki Nikoloudi v Organismos Tilepikoinonion £1/ados AE [2005] ECR 
I-1789 and Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Biihnen [2008] 
ECR l-1757 as compared to e.g. Case 15/69 Wurttembergische Milchverwertung-Sudmilch AG v 
Salvatore Ugliola [1969) ECR 363 and Case C-79/99 Julia Schnorbus v Land Hessen [2000] 
ECR I-10997; see Tobler and Waaldijk 2009, p. 735 et seq. 
85 E.g. Bell 20ll , p. 626. 
86 See Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell GmbH v Finanzamt for Grofiunternehmen in Hamburg 
[2008) ECR I- ll29, para 28 of Advocate General Sharpston's opinion. The Court followed her 
suggestion. 
87 ln the Court's case-law, cases involving discrimination through same treatment are 
comparatively rare; see e.g. Case C-400/02 Gerard Merida v Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
[2004) ECR I-8471 (taxation of migrant workers); Joined Cases T-437/04 and T-441/04 Holger 
Standertskjold-Nordenstam and Jean-Claude Heyraud v Commission [2006] I-A-2-00029, II-A-
2-00127 (Union civil servants) and Case C-558/07 The Queen, on the application of S.PC.M. SA, 
C.H. Erbsliih KG, Lake Chemicals and Minerals Ltd and Hercules Inc. v Secretary of State for 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs[2009] ECR 1-5783 (REACH). 
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definition no two situations are in all respects the same, it will always be possible 
to find elements that distinguish them, and it will then be necessary to make a 
judgment on their legal relevance.88 That judgment is necessarily a value judg-
ment. The Court's case-law offers little practical guidance in that regard, other 
than that when legislation is concerned the comparability of situations must be 
assessed in the light of the subject-matter and purpose of the measure in question 
(Test-Achats, para 29, based on a consistent line of case-law).89 
The issues that may arise in this context are well illustrated by a number of 
recent cases decided by the Court on the basis of a general principle of equality. 
For example, in Chat-z.i, mother of twins claimed double parental leave, thereby 
implicitly claiming that her situation is comparable to that of parents who have two 
children consecutively. Similarly, the Commission argued that parents of twins are 
in a situation comparable to that of parents of children separated by a small age 
difference. The Court, however, interpreting the relevant provisions of Union law 
in the light of Article 20 of the Charter, found that there is no suitable comparator 
in such a case. Rather, parents of twins are in a special situation, which must be 
taken into account by the national legislature by making sure that parents of twins 
receive treatment that takes due account of their particular needs.90 
In Sturgeon,9 1 a case involving consumer rights in air transport, passengers 
complained because they were refused compensation for delayed flights, in line 
with the wording of the relevant Union legislation, which mentions a right to 
compensation only in the event of cancellations. The difference in treatment was 
based on the legislator's judgment that the situations of the airlines in terms of 
their responsibility are not comparable with respect to delays and cancellations. 
The Court, interpreting the relevant provisions in the light of the general principle 
of equality tout court, relied on a different comparison. It compared the situations 
of the air passengers in terms of the damage they suffered in the event of delays 
and cancellations and found them comparable.92 
Comparability also played an essential role in Test-Achats, where the Court had 
to examine the validity of a provision of secondary non-discrimination law. This 
case, which concerns the treatment of men and women in insurance contracts, not 
only involves different layers of the Union's system of equality law, it also pro-
vides a particularly useful illustration of the complexity of the issues that may arise 
in the context of comparability. At issue was the validity of Article 5(2) of 
Directive 2004/113, which allowed the Member States, in derogation from the 
principle of equal treatment set up under Article 5(1) and with the exception of 
88 See Advocate General Sharpston in her opinion in Lindorfer, para 24. 
89 See already Advocate General Capotorti in his opinion in Ruckdeschel, p. 1779. 
90 Critical on the Court's approach to comparability Argalias 2010. 
91 Joined Cases C-402/07 and C-432/07 Christopher Sturgeon, Gabriel Sturgeon and Alana 
Sturgeon v Condor Flugdienst GmbH (C-402107); Stefan Bock and Comelia l.Rpuschitz v Air 
Fra11ce SA (C-432/07) [2009) ECR I-10923. 
92 See e.g. Lenaens and Gutierrez-Fons 2010, p. 1636. Critical on Sturgeon e.g. Mendes de Leon 
2010. 
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costs related to pregnancy and maternity regulated under Article 5(3), to decide 
before 21 December 2007 to permit proportionate differences in individuals' 
premiums and benefits where the use of sex is a determining factor in the 
assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical data. 
Article 5(2) was the result of the legislative process (the Commission's proposal 
had provided for equal treatment after a transitional period).93 It reflected the 
legislator's view that factual differences between men and women with respect to 
the levels of risk of the respective groups were relevant for the purpose at hand 
and, therefore, could lead to different treatment of the individuals belonging to 
these groups. 
The Court based its examination on Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter on the one 
hand, and on the legal basis of Directive 2004/113 on the other. In the context of 
the latter, it stated that the legislator was entitled to bring about equal treatment of 
the sexes in the field of insurance gradually, with appropriate transitional periods. 
In the context of the former, it found that the legislator had acted in an inconsistent 
manner: whilst it started from the legal presumption of comparability as expressed 
in Article 5(1) (in other words, from the absence of any legally relevant differ-
ences), it then nevertheless allowed for a permanent derogation (as expressed in 
Article 5(2), which implies the presence of legally relevant differences). The 
combination of these findings led to the Court to declare Article 5(2) invalid as of 
21 December 2012.94 
Different from Sturgeon, the Court in Test-Achats did not enter into an 
examination of the appropriateness of relying on factual differences (i.e. differ-
ences between groups of male and female insurance policy holders based on 
actuarial and statistical factors). Rather, it appears to focus on the consistency of 
the legislator's choices, similar to the approach in Ruckdeschel, where it relied on 
the 'original' decision by the legislator on comparability, which had led to the 
same treatment of quellmehl and starch, and found that the later decision, namely 
to abolish the refund only for quellmehl, was inconsistent in the absence of proof 
of factors showing that quellmehl and starch were no longer in comparable situ-
ations. It remains unclear what are the consequences of Test-Achats for the 
assessment of the comparability of situations of insurance policy holders in other 
contexts (namely statutory pensions under Directive 7917,95 and occupational 
pensions under Directive 2006/54 and the proposed Directive on implementing the 
93 Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
women and men in the access to and supply of goods and services, COM(2003) 657 fin., pp. 6-9. 
94 Tobler 20lla, with further references; see also the Commission's Guidelines on the 
application of Council Directive 2004/113/EC to insurance, in the light of the judgment of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-236/09, 01 2012 C !Ill. 
95 Council Directive 7917/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ 1979 L 6/24. 
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principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation).96 
The complexity of the issue is further illustrated by the arguments of Advocate 
General Van Gerven, made almost 20 years ago in the context of occupational 
pensions and alleged sex discrimination. According to the Advocate General, 
differences established on the basis of actuarial factors between men and women as 
groups cannot be legally relevant when it comes to the calculation of contributions 
and benefits ascribed to individuals (like the Commission, the Advocate General 
advocated an individual, rather than a group-based approach).97 Moreover, com-
parability was only the second label for his argument in favour of an individual 
approach: his first argument was couched in terms of justification, similar .to 
Advocates General Jacobs and Sharpston in their opinions in the staff case Lm-
dorfer (para 46 et seq. and para 46, respectively). Recently, the Court confi~ed in 
a different context that the same factual element may be relevant m the analytically 
different contexts of comparability and objective justification (Rosado Santana, 
para 69),98 which is rather confusing.99 
Objective Justification 
Turning to objective justification, it would appear that it is ~ess defin~d ~s a 
concept in the context of the general principles of equality than m that of md1rect 
discrimination or restrictions. In the context of the latter two legal concepts, there 
must be a legitimate aim that must not be of a purely economic nature, and the 
measure in question must be appropriate (suitable) and necessary (requisite).100 In 
the context of the former, the test appears to be more generally one of 
arbitrariness. tOt 
In practice, the assessment of objective justification in cases involving a gener~l 
principle of equality may be extremely brief, or even non-existent. For example, m 
96 Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle ~f equ_al treatment between 
persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual onenrauon, COM(2008) 426 
fin. 
97 Joined opinions of Advocate General Van Gerven in Cases C-109/91 Gerardus Comelis ten 
Oever v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor het glazenwassers- en schoonmaakbedrl]k, C-109/ 
91 Michael Moroni and ColloGmbH, C-110/91 David Neath v Hugh Steeper Ltd. and C-200/91 
Coloroll Pension Trustees v lames Richard Russet and Others [1993] ECR I-4879, para 34 et seq. 
This is also the issue behind the US case-law cited by the Advocate General (and by Advocate 
General Kokott in her opinion in Test-Achats). 
9S Case C-177/10 Francisco Javier Rosado Santana v Consejeria de Justicia y Administraci6n 
Publica de la Junta de Andalucia, judgment of 8 September 2011, n.y.r. 
99 Compare Gerards 2005, pp. 71 and 347. 
100 For an illustrative application in the area of free movement for workers, see Advocate 
General Sharpston's opinion in Case C-542109 Commission v The Nether/and of 16 February 
2012, n.y.r. 
101 Tridimas 2006, pp. 84 and 92 et seq. 
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Sturgeon the Court simply stated that no objective justification for the different 
treatment in question appeared to exist, without any further elaborations. In Test-
Achat~, there is no mention of justification at all. Conversely, age discrimination 
cases m the !me of Mangold contain extensive elaborations on justification. The 
reason for. t~s lies in a special approach of the Court to the interpretation of the 
general pnnc1ple of equality on the ground of age (and in the same vein, to those 
on the grounds of religion or belief, disability and sexual orientation), which leads 
to a much more detailed framework of analysis. 
From Mangold via Kiicukdeveci to Prigge: Making (Some) General Principles of 
Equality Quite Concrete 
As was already noted, the Court in the Mangold and Kucukdeveci line of cases 
applies the general principle with respect to age 'as given expression in Directive 
2000!78'. The link thus made with the Directive led the Court to examine the 
existence of discrimination in the light of the provisions of the Directive. As Bellto2 
puts it, the Court embodies the general principle with the detailed contents of the 
Directive. Obviously, the same would not have been possible with respect to the 
general principle of equality tout court, which underlines the practical importance 
of the second layer in the multi-level architecture of equality under Union law. 
In this manner, not only do the legal definitions of direct and indirect discrimi-
na.tio? under Article 2 of the Directive become relevant as a matter of the general 
pnnctple, but so, too, do the Directive's comparatively more restrictive rules on 
justi~c~tio~. The practical consequences are well illustrated by Prigge, an age 
d1scrurunauon case concerning pilots, whose employment contracts were auto-
matically terminated when they reached the age of 60, pursuant to a collective 
agreement. Having recalled the existence of the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of age which must be regarded as a general principle of EU law and which 
has been given specific expression in Directive 2000/78 in the domain of employ-
ment and occupation, and having further recalled its incorporation in Article 21 of 
the Char:er, ~e Court examines the questions before it in the light of the provisions 
of the DtrectlVe on scope, the definition of direct discrimination and justification. 
The Court finds that rules of a collective agreement such as that at issue in 
Prigge concern the employment conditions of workers within the meaning of 
.A.ftJcle 3(l)(c) of the Directive and are, therefore, within the scope of the Direc-
tl.ve. ~ext, the Court states that a pilot who attains the age of 60 is in a comparable 
s~tu.auon to that of a younger pilot performing the same activity for the same 
rurlme ~ompany and/or falling under the same collective agreement, and that the 
former IS treated in a less favourable manner than the latter, directly on the ground 
102 Bell 2011, p. 628. 
466 C. Tobler 
of his age. Turning to the issue of justification, the Court examines several grounds 
from the 'complex web of derogations' 103 under Directive 2000178. It rejects 
justification based on Article 2(5) (according to which the Directive i~ 'without 
prejudice to measures laid down by national law which, in a democratiC soc1ety, 
are necessary for public security, for the maintenance of public order and ~he 
prevention of criminal offences, for the protection of h~alth and for the protectiOn 
of the rights and freedoms of others') and based on Article 4(1) (which allows for 
different treatment based on a characteristic related to the discrimination ground 
that constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement) for lack of 
necessity. It also rejects justification based on Article 6(1) (whic~ .allows .for 
different treatment if 'objectively and reasonably justified by a leg1t1mate a1m, 
including legitimate employment policy, labour market and :ocational trainin~ 
objectives [ . .. ) if the means of achieving that aim are approp~ate ~d necessar~ 
and in this context mentions several examples), because JUStification under this 
provision is limited to social policy objectives. . . 
Overall, given that the issue at hand falls within the scope ofDrrecnv.e 2?0017.8 an? 
that there is different treatment on grounds of age for which there 1s no JUSUficatlOn, tt 
must be concluded that a rule of the type at issue in Prigge constitutes direct age 
discrimination. Even though the Court constantly refers to Directive 2000178, it must 
be remembered that what is at issue is discrimination under the general principle with 
respect to age 'as given expression in Directive 2000178 in the domain of employment 
and occupation'. The case shows that with this approach Court has found a .way to 
make the meaning of the prohibition of discrimination under the general pnne1ple/the 
Charter much more specific than would otherwise be the case. This is particularly 
evident on the level of justification, where the analysis in cases such as Prigge 
contrasts starkly with that in other cases decided on the basis of a general principle of 
equality. In this context, non-discrimination is clearly more than a general standard of 
fairness and rationality. 
However the fact remains that the Mangold approach as reflected in Prigge is 
rather peculiar. In effect, it means that in a horizontal s~tuation where Directi:'e 
2000178 could not have been relied on had it been applicable (compare Domm-
guez), the Directive is held not to be applicable (based on the argument that. the 
prohibition of discrimination on the ground of age flows fr~m a general p~nc1ple 
rather than from the Directive), but then nevertheless used m order to prov1de the 
necessary link to bring the matter at issue within the scope of Union law, in order 
to allow for the applicability of the general principle of equality with respect to 
age, whose meaning in turn is determined relying on the specific content of the 
(non-applicable!) Directive. Those familiar with the tales of .the legendary Baron 
von Miinchhausen may feel reminded of the story m wh1ch the baron saved 
hi h . 104 himself from drowning by pulling himself up by s own a1r. 
103 Barnard 2001, p. 970. 
10.1 Baron von Miinchhausen: "[ ... ] und fie! nicht weit vom andern Ufer bis an den Hals in den 
Morast. Hier hatte ich ohnfehlbar umkommen miissen, wenn nicht die Starke meines eigenen 
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5 Conclusion 
From the very beginnings of European Community law, the meaning and the role 
of the prohibition of discrimination has been shaped by the Court's case-law. 
Modern Union law contains numerous provisions that prohibit discrimination in 
different fields and in different manners. Ultimately, all of these are part of a larger 
and sophisticated construct in which the statutory non-discrimination provisions 
are specific enunciations of general principles of equality and in which the latter 
find expression in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Following Mangold and Kuciikdeveci, some writers have wondered whether 'an 
EU style fundamental right no to be discriminated against on grounds of age (and 
other grounds listed in Article 19 TFEU) [ .. . ] is but a variation of the principle of 
equality before the law or rather an emanation of a fundamental right to non-
discrimination', 105 and whether now a distinction has to be made between a 
'parent' equality principle and 'subsidiary' equality principles. 106 In the present 
writer 's analysis, it is clear from the Court's case-law that two distinct layers of 
general principles of equality with different functions and, to some extent, also 
different meanings must be distinguished, namely the general principle of equality 
tout court and general principles of equality with a particular focus. Case-law 
shows that the latter are emanations of fundamental rights to non-discrimination as 
incorporated in Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter and that these in turn can be seen 
as specific expressions of the general principle of equality tout court enshrined in 
Article 20 of the Charter. In that sense, the latter indeed embodies a parent equality 
principle of which the general principles of equality with a particular focus are 
(more specific) subsidiaries. 
In the present writer's opinion, the building of this layered system is one of the 
most fascinating aspects of the Court's case-law. At the same time, this construct 
raises difficult questions when it comes to its practical implications. This concerns 
less the main function of the general principles of equality, namely to serve as an 
interpretative framework and as part of the principles of judicial review,107 than 
the additional function of filling gaps in the Union' s non-discrimination Jaw in 
cases of alleged discrimination. In this context, it was argued that the Court's 
much-debated Mangold line of case-law has a very special place in the Union' s 
layered system of equality. Through it, the Court in the specific context of 
Directive 2000/78 has found a surprising way to operationalise the general prin-
ciples that have found expression in that Directive and to give them a meaning that 
(Footnote 104 continued) 
Armes mich an meinem eigenen Haar:z.opfe, sarnt dem Pferde, welches ich fest :z.wischen meine 
Kniee schloB, wieder herausge:z.ogen hatte." I wish to thank my colleague Armin Cuyvers from 
Leiden University for suggesting the use of this metaphor in the present context. 
105 Schiek 2012, p. 234. 
106 Semmelmann 2011, p. 246. 
107 McCrudden and Kountouris 2007, p. 88. 
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goes considerably further than the general standard offaimess and rationality that 
is otherwise typical for the Union's general principles of equality. In this specific 
context, the general principles of equality in effect embody precise, detailed and 
meticulously drafted rules-which is precisely what has been said not to be 
possible for general principles. 108 However, there are some first indications in the 
Court's case-law that it might not easily be possible to apply the Mangold 
approach in other contexts. 
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